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The ‘bias’ paradox -I
 Several feminists have criticised several 
scientific theories for their sexist biases (e.g. 
Longino, 1990)
 But feminists have also generally argued that 
value-free and impartial theories are 
impossible (e.g. Harding, 1986).
 This situation seemingly leads to a paradox: 
 if bias is inevitable, then it is pointless to criticise others for being 
biased (Antony, 1993).
 If impartiality is impossible, then it is futile to criticise others for 
being partial. But if impartiality is possible and a good thing, then 
feminist values cannot play any positive role (Anderson, 2002, 498)
The ‘bias’ paradox -II
 Some critics of feminist epistemology 
advocate on feminist grounds support for 
value free enquiry (Cf. Haack, 1997).
 Others attempt to develop a criterion to 
determine which values, and in which roles, 
can legitimately play a role in the justification
of theories (e.g., Antony, 1993 and Anderson, 
1995, 20002 and 2004)
Value Neutrality and Impartiality
 There are at least senses in which science could be 
objective (Cf Lacey, 1999 and 2002; Anderson, 2002 
and 2004):
 Value-neutrality: Scientific theories do not imply or 
presuppose any noncognitive intrinsic value judgements, nor 
do scientific theories serve any particular non-cognitive 
values more fully than others (Anderson, 2002, p. 497 and 
2004, p. 3)
 Impartiality: The only grounds for accepting a theory are its 
relations to the evidence and their manifestations of the 
cognitive values. These grounds are impartial among rival 
noncognitive values (Anderson, 2002, p. 497 and 2004, p. 3)
Values and the goals of enquiry
 Value-neutrality and impartiality are 
themselves evaluative concepts.
 Their value will depend on whether they 
promote the ends or goals of enquiry.
 The ends or goals of enquiry are:
 Knowledge or truth (Anderson, 2002, 498)
 Significance or relevance (Anderson, 2002, 498)
 Understanding
The case against value-neutrality
 Value-neutrality undermines the goal of 
producing significant truths, because 
assessments of significance depend on value-
laden judgements.
 Significance is an evaluative matter
 Cognitive values are not enough to determine 
significance.
 Significance is relative to practical interests, 
sociopolitical and moral values.
The legitimate justificatory 
roles of non-cognitive values
 Three ways in which contextual values matter 
to theory choice:
 Values contribute to determining standards of 
significance and adequacy to be met by theories.
 Values contribute to the classification of objects 
and phenomena into kinds.
 Values contribute to choices of methods since 
some possibilities can only explored by the use of 
some methods rather than others. 
Value neutrality is not a value
 One aim of enquiry is the production of 
knowledge which is significant or relevant
 What makes an item of knowledge significant 
or relevant is often relative to one’s 
contextual values or interests.
 Therefore, contextual values are among the 
determinants of which theories should be 
accepted as containing significant knowledge.
 Therefore, value neutrality is not an ideal or a 
value to be adopted in enquiry.
Anderson’s case for impartiality
 A provisional view:
 The only grounds for accepting a theory as true 
are those permitted by the value of impartiality.
 Contextual values contribute to determining the 
choice of the most significant theory among those 
which are legitimately accepted as true. 
 Impartiality does not require value neutrality.
Problems for the provisional view
 Undermining the provisional view:
 The theory itself can include concepts which are evaluative (e.g., 
employed; pathogenic; dominant). 
 The evidence itself can include facts which are the result of social 
intervention.
 The ranking of cognitive values and their distinction from non-
cognitive ones is itself an evaluative matter which depends on 
socio-political values
 Evidence for a theory is NOT independent of contextual values
 How data are classified can be value-dependent
 Whether some data exist can depend on value driven social 
intervention
 Which cognitive values matter most can be driven by contextual 
values
 How telling some data is, depends on which alternatives should be 
considered (and that is a value driven matter of significance)
Is impartiality a value? Which 
value?
 The problems with the provisional view lead Anderson to revise 
impartiality.
 Revision 1: the grounds adduced to justify a theory should be based on 
standards that transcend the competing interests of advocates of rival 
views (Anderson, 1995).
 No further than original view
 A problematic moral reading (moral impartiality is the only legitimate value)
 Revision 2: ’Given the same background assumptions, and accepting 
the conceptual frameworks of all hypotheses for the sake of argument, 
all rational inquirers will agree on the direction of support a given body 
of new evidence offers to rival hypotheses, regardless of the value 
judgements they accept' (Anderson, 2002, 514).
 A very weak definition which is of no use in theory choice
In praise of partiality-I
 But why think impartiality is a value?
 Assumed that value judgments do not stand in evidential 
connections with factual judgements.
 Clearly false as we know from the Frege-Geach problem for 
expressivism.
 Assumed that value judgments are never rationally held (or are all 
on a par) and in particular that final ends are never rationally 
chosen.
 Values are not on a par. It is still a matter of debate whether final ends 
can be rationally chosen.
 If these assumptions are rejected, then there is no reason why 
values could not be included among the evidence for accepting 
a theory.
 This is not accepting propaganda- values too like the rest of the 
evidence should be subjected to scrutiny.
In praise of partiality-II
 What sort of scrutiny?
 Values must be viable: they must not presuppose factual 
claims that are incompatible with properly accepted theories.
 Values must be epistemically fruitful: they support theories 
which manifest cognitive values to a high degree
 Values must be rationally defensible on moral grounds
 It does not mean that the same values should be 
rationally held by everybody (what is intrinsically 
valuable for a person may depend on their 
circumstances.)
Answering the Paradox
 The use of contextual values in the justification of 
theory is legitimate iff:
 The values themselves are justified on grounds which 
are independent of the theory they support.
 The values are viable and epistemically fruitful.
 Local epistemology: which intrinsic values are 
rationally held might depend on 
circumstances that vary from person to 
person
Standpoint and Empiricism: A 
Re-assessment
 The standpoint of the oppressed is 
epistemically privileged.
 The values which are rationally held by 
those whose circumstances are 
oppressive are more likely to be both 
viable and fruitful.
